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Abstract 
In R (on the application of Plan B Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 214, 
[2020] 2 WLUK 372, the Court of Appeal held that the Secretary of State had acted unlawfully by 
failing to take into account the UK’s commitments in the 2015 Paris Agreement when he decided to 
designate a policy formulated to enable the construction of a third runway at Heathrow airport as a 
‘national policy statement’ under the Planning Act 2008. An appeal to the Supreme Court is pending. 
The outcome of that appeal should help to clarify the legal significance of the Paris Agreement and 
will have significant implications both for expansion at Heathrow airport, for other major 
infrastructure projects and for other planning and environmental litigation. 
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Airport Expansion in South East England 
In R (on the application of Plan B Earth) v Secretary of State for Transport (the Court of Appeal 
Judgment), Lindblom LJ, Singh LJ and Haddon-Cave LJ noted that expansion of Heathrow airport was 
necessary, at least in the view of the UK Government, to preserve the country’s status as a ‘leading 
aviation “hub”’.1 In a joint judgment, however, they decided that a national policy statement (NPS), 
formulated to enable the construction of a third runway at Heathrow, was unlawful. In doing so, 
they compelled the Government to reconsider that policy statement before construction of the 
runway could commence. The Lord Justices recognised that their judgment might be interpreted as 
 
1 [2020] EWCA Civ 214, [2020] 2 WLUK 372 at [2]. 
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an instance of judicial meddling in political decision-making and explained that, although they had 
been asked to adjudicate on various planning and environmental law issues, their decision rested on 
a single issue. While the Supreme Court has granted permission to appeal,2 the Court of Appeal 
judgment raises significant questions about expansion at Heathrow, other major infrastructure 
projects and the UK’s decarbonisation and climate change mitigation commitments 
Facts of the case 
Construction of a third runway at Heathrow has been a long-standing ambition for UK 
Governments.3 In 2012, the Conservative and Liberal Democrat Coalition Government established 
the Airports Commission to make recommendations as to how the UK’s airport capacity might be 
increased ‘to maintain the UK’s position as Europe’s most important aviation hub’.4 The Airports 
Commission shortlisted three proposals: a proposal from Gatwick Airport Ltd for a new runway at 
Gatwick airport (the Gatwick Proposal); a proposal from Heathrow Airport Ltd for a new runway 
north west of Heathrow’s northernmost existing runway (the Heathrow NWR Proposal); and a 
proposal from Heathrow Hub Ltd for an extension to the northern runway to enable that runway to, 
in effect, operate as two runways. The Airports Commission concluded that the Heathrow NWR 
Proposal was the most likely to achieve the hub objective.5 To provide the policy framework for the 
proposal’s implementation, the Secretary of State for Transport published an Airports National 
Policy Statement (the ANPS) on 5 June 2018. Parliament debated the ANPS and voted, by a majority 
of 296, in favour of its designation as an NPS.6 The Secretary of State then decided to designate it, 
pursuant to section 5 of the Planning Act 2008 (PA 2008), on 26 June 2018.7 
Case History 
The High Court considered five judicial review claims related to the Secretary of State’s decision in 
two separate hearings and in two separate judgments. Heathrow Hub Ltd and Runways Innovations 
Ltd (the promotors of the Heathrow extended northern runway scheme) brought one claim to 
challenge the Secretary of State’s decision to designate the ANPS.8 While that claim reached the 
 
2 Supreme Court, Permission to appeal decisions (7 May 2020) 
<https://www.supremecourt.uk/news/permission-to-appeal-decisions-07-may-2020.html> accessed 10 May 
2020. 
3 In 2003, for example, the Labour Government proposed a new runway and terminal building at Heathrow 
(Department for Transport, The Future of Air Transport (December 2003), 13-14). 
4 Airports Commission, Final Report (July 2015) at para. 1.3. ‘Hubs’ are airports where airlines transfer 
passengers and cargo to other flights. 
5 Ibid. at para. 13.3. 
6 The Court of Appeal Judgment, above n. 1 at [35]. 
7 Ibid. at [3]. 
8 R (on the application of Heathrow Hub Ltd) v the Secretary of State for Transport [2019] EWHC 1069 (Admin), 
[2019] 4 WLUK 429. 
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Court of Appeal,9 it is not considered here because it does not pertain directly to environmental law 
issues.  
The High Court considered the four other claims in a ‘rolled-up’ hearing in which 
Hickinbottom LJ and Holgate J examined both the applications for permission and the substantive 
issues.10 Ten claimants presented grounds for review: the London Borough of Hillingdon and four 
adjacent London Boroughs; the Mayor of London; Greenpeace Ltd; Friends of the Earth Ltd (FoE); 
Plan B Earth (Plan B); and Mr Neil Spurrier, a litigant-in-person. Heathrow Airport Ltd, the Secretary 
of State for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, Transport for London, and Arora Holdings Ltd 
(which owns substantial landholdings on the site to be developed and which would construct and 
operate a new terminal building) appeared as Interested Parties, with WWF-UK also intervening. The 
claimants raised 22 grounds challenging the decision to designate the ANPS: 
• The London Boroughs, the Mayor of London and Greenpeace jointly claimed that the 
conclusions on surface access and air quality were unlawful, that the assessment of and 
conclusions on habitats and species conversation were unlawful, that the strategic 
environmental assessment that informed the ANPS and the conclusions in that assessment were 
unlawful, and that the consultation informing the ANPS was flawed.11  
• FoE claimed that the Secretary of State had breached duties in the PA 2008 by failing either to 
explain how he had taken into account Government policy relating to the mitigation of, and 
adaptation to, climate change12 or to conduct a broader enquiry of the need to mitigate and 
adapt to climate change,13 and that the Secretary of State had erred by failing to consider the 
UK’s commitments in the 2015 Paris Agreement14 (or, alternatively, by failing to explain how he 
had considered those commitments).15 
• Plan B claimed that the UK’s commitments in the Paris Agreement represented Government 
policy on mitigating and adapting to climate change and that the Secretary of State had erred in 
failing to consider those commitments.16 
 
9 R (on the application of Heathrow Hub Ltd) v the Secretary of State for Transport [2020] EWCA Civ 213, [2020] 
2 WLUK 347. 
10 R (on the application of Spurrier) v the Secretary of State for Transport, [2019] EWHC 1070 (Admin), [2020] 
PTSR 240 (the High Court Judgment). 
11 Ibid. at Appendix A at [1]-[10]. 
12 An alleged breach of sections 5(7) and (8) of the PA 2008. 
13 An alleged breach of section 10(3)(a) of the PA 2008. 
14 Adopted 12 December 2015; ratified by the UK Government 18 November 2016. 
15 An alleged breach of Sch. 2 para. 5 of the Environmental Assessment of Plans and Programmes Regulations 
2004 (SI 2004, No. 1633). FoE’s grounds are summarised in the High Court Judgment, above n. 10, Appendix A 
at [11]-[13]. 
16 An alleged breach of sections 5(8) and 10(3)(a) of the PA 2008 and section 3 of the Human Rights Act 1998. 
Plan B’s ground are summarised in the High Court Judgment, above n. 10, Appendix A at [14]-[16]. 
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• Mr Spurrier claimed that the decision was unlawful because of a failure to consult, actual and/or 
apparent bias, human rights violations, flawed air quality appraisals, and because policy in the 
ANPS would lead to a breach of the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement and the Climate Change 
Act 2008 (CCA 2008).17 
None of the grounds of challenge were successful. 
The Appeal Case 
The London Boroughs, the Mayor of London, Greenpeace, FoE and Plan B appealed. Mr Spurrier did 
not.  
The first set of grounds to be raised concerned issues related to Council Directive 
1992/43/EEC (OJ L 206 20.7.92) on the conservation of natural habitats and of wild fauna and flora 
(the Habitats Directive). The Lord Justices rejected these grounds and concluded that: 
• The ‘Wednesbury’ irrationality standard of review applies to matters arising under articles 6(3) 
and 6(4) of the Habitats Directive;18 
• The Secretary of State did not act unlawfully by concluding that the Gatwick Proposal was not an 
‘alternative solution’ to be considered in a habitats regulations assessment for the purposes of 
article 6(4) because the Government’s ‘hub’ objective was a long-standing and legitimate aim 
that the Gatwick Proposal would not fulfil.19 The ‘overriding’ nature of that objective also 
obviated any need to assess whether the Gatwick Proposal would harm Special Areas of 
Conservation;20 and 
• The High Court did not err in finding that the requirement to consider alternative solutions in the 
Habitats Directive imposed a different obligation to the requirement to consider ‘reasonable 
alternatives’ in article 5(1) of Council Directive 2001/42/EC (OJ L 197 21.7.01) on the assessment 
of the effects of certain plans and programmes on the environment (the SEA Directive). 
Similarly, the High Court did not err by concluding that the Secretary of State had not acted 
unlawfully by treating the Gatwick Proposal as a reasonable alternative under the SEA Directive 
but not as an alternative solution under the Habitats Directive. The SEA Directive required the 
identification of a broad range of reasonable alternatives for consultation purposes whereas the 
Habitats Directive required only a consideration of viable alternatives.21 
 
17 Ibid. at Appendix A at [17]-[22]. 
18 The Court of Appeal Judgment, above n. 1 at [75]-[79]. 
19 Ibid. at [87]-[88]. 
20 Ibid. at [101]. 
21 Ibid. at [116]. 
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The second set of grounds concerned matters raised under the SEA Directive, which the Lord Justices 
also dismissed, concluding that: 
• The Wednesbury irrationality standard applied to the Secretary of State’s conclusion as to the 
information that ‘may reasonably be required’ under article 5(2) and Annex I of the SEA 
Directive;22 
• The Secretary of State did not act unlawfully for the purposes of article 5(1) and Annex I either 
by concluding that consideration of carbon budgets adopted by the Greater London Authority 
would have made no material difference to the environmental assessment or by conducting a 
cumulative appraisal rather than a more comprehensive assessment of the relationship between 
the Heathrow NWR Proposal and relevant local plan policies for administrative areas likely to be 
severely affected by the proposal;23 
• The Secretary of State did not breach article 5(1) or paragraph (c) of Annex I by relying upon a 
noise impact statement that considered indicative flight paths and noise thresholds based on 
expert advice and that assessed the numbers of people and buildings, rather than the specific 
land uses, likely to suffer significant noise effects.24 
The final set of grounds concerned climate change matters. The Lord Justices upheld these grounds 
and made a declaration preventing the ANPS from having legal effect unless the Secretary of State 
reviewed the policy in the statement.25 Specifically, the Lord Justices concluded that the 
commitments in article 2(1) of the Paris Agreement represented Government policy for the purposes 
of section 5(8) of the PA 2008 because the Government had ratified the Paris Agreement and 
ministerial statements had affirmed the Government’s ‘policy of adherence’ to those 
commitments.26 The Secretary of State had consequently acted unlawfully by failing to consider 
those commitments when deciding to designate the ANPS. The commitments were also ‘so 
obviously material’ to the decision to designate that the Secretary of State’s failure to consider them 
breached section 10(3)(a) of the PA 2008.27 Similarly, the Paris Agreement represented an 
international ‘environmental protection objective’ under paragraph (e) of Annex I of the SEA 
Directive so the Secretary of State acted unlawfully by failing to consider the UK’s commitments in 
the environmental assessment that informed the ANPS.28 Finally, the Secretary of State had acted 
 
22 Ibid. at [136]. 
23 Ibid. at [155]-[162]. 
24 Ibid. at [175]-[183]. 
25 Ibid. at [280]. 
26 Ibid. at [228]. 
27 Ibid. at [237]. 
28 Ibid. at [246]. 
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unlawfully by failing to consider either the effect of carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions beyond 2050 or 
the non-CO2 climate change effects of aviation.29 If the Secretary of State reviewed the ANPS, he or 
she would have to take these matters into account. 
On 7 May 2020, Heathrow Airport Ltd and Arora Holdings Ltd were granted permission to 
appeal to the Supreme Court so that the court could determine whether the Secretary of State’s 
failure to consider the Paris Agreement did make the decision to designate the ANPS unlawful (the 
Supreme Court Appeal).30 The Government has not appealed.31  
Discussion 
The Supreme Court Appeal will address important questions about the regime for authorising 
‘nationally significant infrastructure projects’ (NSIPs), about airport expansion in South East England 
and about the UK Government’s climate change commitments.  
Before the Secretary of State decided to designate the ANPS, the Airports Commission had 
advised that the Government’s preferred runway proposal would need ‘planning consent’ before 
construction could begin.32 The Commission identified two options. The Government could exercise 
powers under the PA 2008 to publish an NPS detailing the policy framework to which the Secretary 
of State should ‘have regard’, pursuant to section 104(2)(a) of the 2008 Act, in deciding whether or 
not to grant a ‘development consent order’. Or the Government could use a Hybrid Bill akin to those 
enacted for the Channel Tunnel Rail Link, Crossrail and the HS2 railway.  
On 25 October 2016, the Secretary of State announced that the Government favoured the 
Heathrow NWR Proposal and that it would publish an NPS to provide the policy framework within 
which an applicant could apply for development consent.33 Under section 14(1)(i) of the PA 2008, 
the expansion plans would constitute an NSIP. A development consent order authorises NSIPs by 
grouping planning permission, highways orders, scheduled ancient monuments orders, listed 
building consents and compulsory purchase orders into a single statutory instrument.34 An NPS 
should thus provide the policy framework not just for the grant of planning permission but also for 
the grant of other rights and powers. However, before designating a statement as an NPS, the 
Secretary of State must ‘have regard to the desirability of mitigating, and adapting to, climate 
 
29 Ibid. at [256]-[257]. 
30 Above n. 2. 
31 HC Deb 27 February 2020, vol. 672, cols. 23WS-24WS. 
32 Airports Commission, above n. 4 at para. 16.22. 
33 HC Deb 25 October 2016, vol. 616, cols. 162-166. 
34 PA 2008 at section 33(1). See section 122(1) in relation to compulsory purchase orders. 
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change’.35 Alongside this, an NPS must provide reasons for the policy in the statement,36 including an 
explanation of how the policy ‘takes account of Government policy relating to the mitigation of, and 
adaptation to, climate change’.37 
The Secretary of State accepted that the PA 2008 obliged him to consider existing domestic 
legal and policy obligations related to climate change when designating the ANPS. These obligations 
could be found, the Secretary of State argued, in section 1(1) of the CCA 2008.38 Since the 
designation of the ANPS, the Climate Change Act 2008 (2050 Target Amendment) Order 2019 has 
amended section 1(1) of the CCA 2008 to oblige the Government to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emissions to a level at least 100 percent lower than a 1990 baseline (the CCA Amendment).39 
However, when the Secretary of State decided to designate the ANPS, the CCA 2008 obliged the 
Government to reduce emissions, against the 1990 baseline, by 80 percent by 2050 (the Pre-
Amendment Obligation). The sustainability appraisal accompanying the ANPS had thus concluded 
that the Heathrow NWR Proposal could be delivered in compliance with the Pre-Amendment 
Obligation.40 On the other hand, however, neither the ANPS nor the accompanying sustainability 
appraisal referred to any of the UK’s commitments in the Paris Agreement. In article 2(1) of that 
Agreement, participating nations agreed to hold ‘the increase in the global average temperature to 
well below 2˚C above pre-industrial levels and [to pursue] efforts to limit the temperature increase 
to 1.5˚C above pre-industrial levels’. The Secretary of State argued that he had not ignored this 
commitment but that he had concluded that it was not relevant to the decision to designate the 
ANPS unless and until the Government amended section 1(1) of the CCA 2008.41 The Lord Justices 
concluded, however, that sections 5(8) and 10(3)(a) of the PA 2008 did impose a legal obligation on 
the Secretary of State to consider the commitments in the Paris Agreement, which meant that the 
decision to designate was unlawful.  
If the Supreme Court agrees with the Court of Appeal’s conclusions, the case will not 
prohibit construction of a third runway at Heathrow. Nor will it compel Ministers to avoid decisions 
that might be incompatible with the UK’s international commitments. Instead, the Court of Appeal 
concluded, for a single reason, that the decision to designate the ANPS was unlawful. The Lord 
Justices did not quash the ANPS and they did not order the Secretary of State to conduct a review 
 
35 Ibid. at section 10(3)(a). 
36 Ibid. at section 5(7). 
37 Ibid. at section 5 (8). 
38 The Court of Appeal Judgment, above n. 1 at [218]. 
39 SI 2019, No. 1056. 
40 Department for Transport, Airports National Policy Statement: new runway capacity and infrastructure at 
airports in the South East of England (June 2018) at para. 3.69. 
41 The Court of Appeal Judgment, above n. 1 at [218]. 
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under the review mechanism in the PA 2008.42 They did, however, state that the ANPS could not 
take legal effect unless and until the Secretary of State reviewed it to take account of how the policy 
affected the UK’s commitments in the Paris Agreement. If the Supreme Court agrees with the Court 
of Appeal Judgment, the Secretary of State could designate an appropriately reviewed statement as 
an NPS if he felt that a new runway would be compatible with those commitments.  
If the Supreme Court disagrees with the Court of Appeal’s conclusions, the ANPS would take 
effect. However, the Secretary of State might then still decide to review the ANPS because he must 
conduct a review whenever he ‘thinks it appropriate.’43 In deciding whether or not to review, he 
would have to determine if the CCA Amendment amounted to a significant change in the basis on 
which the policy in the ANPS was decided and if that change would have made a ‘material 
difference’ to the policy if it had been anticipated at the time.44 Following that review, the Secretary 
of State could amend or withdraw the statement.45 
If the ANPS does take effect, with or without a review, the Secretary of State must have 
regard to it when considering an application for development consent, unless one of the exceptions 
listed in the PA 2008 applies.46 Whether an application for development consent would be 
forthcoming, in light of the implications of the current coronavirus pandemic for global aviation, 
would remain to be seen: in oral evidence given to the House of Commons Transport Select 
Committee on 6 May 2020, Heathrow Airport Limited’s Chief Executive speculated that aviation 
demand might justify construction of a third runway at Heathrow within ’10 to 15 years’.47 
Aside from the implications for construction of a third runway at Heathrow, the case has 
implications for both the designation of future NPSs and for the review of other extant NPSs. The 
case will clarify if the PA 2008 obliges the Secretary of State to take into account international 
commitments to which the Government has expressed a ‘policy of adherence’ when deciding to 
designate future NPSs. The case will be important for extant NPSs because a court can consider a 
challenge to a decision by the Secretary of State not to carry out a review.48 At the time of writing, 
three possible claimants have indicated that they will challenge any failure to review the NPSs for 
 
42 Ibid. at [280]. 
43 PA 2008 at section 6(1). 
44 Ibid. at sections 6(3) and 6(4). 
45 Ibid. at section 6(5). 
46 Ibid. at section 104(2)(a). The exceptions arise if granting consent in accordance with an NPS would lead to a 
breach of either international obligations or domestic legislative commitments or would otherwise be unlawful 
(section 104(3)-(6)) or if the adverse effects of the project would outweigh its benefits (section 104(7)). 
47 Quoted in Joanna Partridge, ‘Expansion debate rumbles on amid hush over Britain’s biggest airports’, The 
Observer (9 May 2020) <https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/may/09/aiports-heathrow-gatwick-
expansion-coronavirus-airlines> accessed 10 May 2020. 
48 PA 2008 at section 13(2). 
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major energy infrastructure projects following the CCA Amendment.49 That claim may be 
strengthened if the Supreme Court agrees that designation of the ANPS was unlawful: the Secretary 
of State might then be required to consider whether the Paris Agreement would also have made a 
material difference to the basis on which policy in the NPSs was decided.  
Finally, the case will have important implications for other planning and environmental 
litigation. The High Court has recently heard a judicial review brought by the environmental charity, 
ClientEarth, challenging the decision of the Secretary of State for Business, Energy & Industrial 
Strategy to grant development consent for two gas-fired electricity generating units at Drax Power 
Station in North Yorkshire (the Drax Proposal).50 The Secretary of State appointed two Planning 
Inspectors to examine the Drax application. Those Inspectors concluded that the Government’s 
energy NPSs contained decarbonisation objectives that outweighed any need identified in those 
NPSs for additional gas-fired electricity generation capacity.51 They also concluded that the projected 
GHG emissions would undermine the Government’s legislative commitment to reduce overall 
emissions.52 Since the adverse impacts thus appeared greater than the benefits, the Inspectors 
recommended that the Secretary of State should withhold consent.53  
The Inspectors made their recommendation regarding the Drax Proposal after the UK 
ratified the Paris Agreement but before the CCA Amendment came into force. The Secretary of State 
then issued her decision letter after the Government amended its emissions reduction target. 
Nonetheless, the Secretary of State granted consent.54 She concluded, first, that the Planning 
Inspectors had misinterpreted policy in the NPSs related to decarbonisation, GHG emissions 
reductions and the need for new energy infrastructure.55 She then concluded that granting consent 
would not, in itself, lead to a direct breach of the CCA 2008.56 ClientEarth has challenged those 
 
49 Details of the potential action are available on a case-specific crowdfunding webpage 
<https://www.crowdjustice.com/case/no-new-fossilfuel-projects/> accessed 10 May 2020.  
50 The Drax Proposal is an NSIP under section 14(1)(a) of the PA 2008. 
51 Planning Inspectorate, Examining Authority’s Report of Findings and Conclusions and Recommendation (4 
July 2019) <https://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/projects/yorkshire-and-the-humber/drax-re-
power/> accessed 5 May 2020 at para. 11.1.1. 
52 Ibid. at para. 11.1.2.  
53 Ibid. at para. 11.1.4. 
54 Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, Decision letter related to the application for the Drax 
Power (Generating Stations) Order 2019 (4 October 2019) 
<https://infrastructure.planninginspectorate.gov.uk/projects/yorkshire-and-the-humber/drax-re-power/> 
accessed 5 May 2020 at para. 7.1. 
55 Ibid. at paras. 6.5-6.7. 
56 Ibid. at para. 6.12. 
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conclusions.57 At the time of writing, the substantive issues have been heard but the High Court has 
reserved judgment. When that judgment is received, it will provide further insight into how the 
Government’s legislative and policy commitments to decarbonisation and GHG emissions reduction 
will work in practice. 
Conclusion 
The legal implications of the 2015 Paris Agreement and the UK’s commitment to decarbonisation 
and climate change mitigation are gradually being worked out. The case discussed here will not 
compel UK Government Ministers to avoid decisions that might be incompatible with the UK’s 
domestic and international decarbonisation and climate change mitigation commitments. However, 
the case will confirm if the Secretary of State should, when he decided to designate the ANPS, have 
considered the policy in that statement in the context of the commitments in the Paris Agreement. 
This might have important implications for the designation of other NPSs if the court’s judgment 
suggests that the Secretary of State should consider international commitments to which the 
Government has expressed a ‘policy of adherence’. Alongside other current litigation, the case will 
also clarify the relevant considerations when the Secretary of State either decides to review a 
designated NPS or applies the policy in a designated NPS to grant development consent for a major 
infrastructure project.   
 
 
57 Francis Taylor Building, Permission Granted for Judicial Review by ClientEarth of the Drax Power (Generating 
Stations) Order 2019 (3 February 2020) <https://www.ftbchambers.co.uk/news/permission-granted-judicial-
review-clientearth-drax-power-generating-stations-order-2019> accessed 5 May 2020. 
